










HEALTH VALUES, PREFERENCE INCONSISTENCY, 






CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 1634 












An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com




HEALTH VALUES, PREFERENCE INCONSISTENCY, 





Several empirical studies provide evidence that their actual health state affects people’s 
attitudes towards health and medical care in hypothetical health states. In the tradition of 
behavioural economics this paper considers the actual health state as a point of reference and 
builds a model for studying the implications of this phenomenon on health insurance and on 
demand for medical care. It considers the insurance demand of different types of agents: naive 
individuals, individuals who are able to commit to medical care demand and sophisticated 
individuals. Furthermore, it raises the question of whether inconsistency of preferences 
reinforces or tones down moral hazard problems. 
JEL Code: I11, G22, D82, D91. 
Keywords: health insurance, medical care, health state, behavioural economics, prospect 







RWTH Aachen University 








First version: November 2005. 1 Introduction
A large number of studies have tested empirically whether the actual health state aﬀects the
valuation of health in hypothetical future health states. The evidence is mixed: Some stated
preference studies [see, e.g., Llewellyn-Thomas et al. (1993)] found that the respondent’s
health state does not inﬂuence the valuations, while other studies discovered a direct eﬀect.
Sackett and Torrance (1978) found that ratings for a life that would require dialysis were
lower for the general public than they were for actual dialysis patients. Boyd et al. (1990)
considered carcinoma of the rectum, and found out that utilities assigned to colostomy –
a common outcome of treatment for that disease – depend on the current health state.
Kind and Dolan (1995) and Dolan (1996) found that persons in a state of poor health
value such states relatively highly. They argue that people with past experience of illness
know that they can adapt to poor health. Winter et al. (2003) asked a sample of elderly
people living in congregate housing about their preferences for prolonging life. Frail persons
expressed more preferences for a longer life under bad health conditions than the healthier
participants did. King et al. (2004) interviewed veterans to measure their health values for
diﬀerent hypothetical health states involving a degenerative spine condition. King et al.
(2004) came up with the result that health values for this disease, which were estimated by
diﬀerent techniques, were positively correlated with the currently perceived health state.
There are several explanations for the discrepancies between hypothetical and actual
evaluations. First, stated preference studies are certainly aﬀected by inadequate descrip-
tions of health states. On the basis of a comparison of diﬀerent explanations for dis-
crepancies between hypothetical and actual evaluations, Jansen et al. (2000) argue that
non-corresponding descriptions of hypothetical states explain most of the discrepancies.
Second, the ”new understanding” hypothesis refers to experience or knowledge. As Dolan
(1999) points out, experience has at least three diﬀerent dimensions: the period of illness,
the time since the illness ended and the strength of the relationship between the ill person
and the respondent. Since most studies capture only one or two dimensions of experience,
the variety in the results is not surprising. Furthermore, Dolan (1999) stresses that knowl-
edge of illness might also be inﬂuenced by anticipation of illness (the subjective probability
of illness and the perceived time up to the outbreak of illness). Third, a change in the
1health state may create a real shift in valuation, i.e., a change in the preference ordering
[Dolan (1996)]. Treadwell and Lenert (1999) survey additional empirical evidence which
supports the hypothesis that the actual health state as a point of reference does aﬀect
valuations. To sum up, the evidence for a true valuation shift seems strong enough to start
with the hypothesis that preferences on health ex-ante diﬀer from preferences ex-post.
Many authors have stressed that a valuation shift has important implications for cost-
beneﬁt and cost-eﬀectiveness analysis [e.g., Dolan (1999) and Treadwell and Lenert (1999)].
If preferences of patients and non-patients diﬀer, stated preference studies may be biased
towards either group. More fundamentally, they raise the question of whose preferences
should count at all. What are respondents’ true preferences, when these change over time
and across states? Without a convincing answer to this question, it seems almost impossible
to use standard cost-beneﬁt-analysis as a guideline for investment or for public policy.
The same question has been raised in the literature on hyperbolic discounting or, more
generally, on time-inconsistent preferences [put forward by Strotz (1956), Pollak (1968)
and Laibson (1997)]. This literature envisions an agent with varying lifetime preferences
as an aggregate over multiple selves. For normative purposes, it either applies the Pareto
criterion [see, among others, Laibson (1997) and Diamond and K¨ oszegi (2003)] which is,
unfortunately, not a very discriminating instrument (since preferences of diﬀerent selves
are highly contradictory), or it aggregates selves with a welfare function, which lacks a
convincing set of weights [see, for a discussion of this issue, Bernheim and Rangel (2005)].
Changing preferences for medical treatment should have an eﬀect not only on attitudes
but also on behavior. Recently, behavioral economics has started to develop models for the
analysis of behavior in the area of social security and health economics when preferences
are inconsistent. For example, Diamond and K¨ oszegi (2003) consider the impact of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting on retirement. Kopczuk and Slemrod (2005) show that the denial
of death, i.e., of signals of mortality, leads to inconsistent behavior. Similarly, K¨ oszegi
(2003) analyzes patients’ behavior when anxiety about the future leads them to avoid
visits to their doctor, particularly if they feel really sick. Gruber and K¨ oszegi (2002)
discussed whether tax policy should play a role in the ﬁght against addiction. Frank
(2004) argues that behavioral economics has the potential to contribute substantially to
health economics. Although he focuses on doctor-patient interactions and quality of care,
2he also brieﬂy discusses health insurance and demand for health care. Richman (2005)
stresses that psychology and behavioral economics provide a useful source for the analysis
of Medicaid’s development. This paper, too, applies the behavioral economic approach to
a particular issue in health economics.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the implications of the change in preferences for
economic behavior. The actual health state is considered as a point of reference for individ-
ual valuation. It was the prospect theory, introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979),
which put forward the idea that the value of outcome is relative rather than absolute.
Among others, Treadwell and Lenert (1999) and Winter et al. (2003) have already argued
that prospect theory does indeed predict that the current health state should aﬀect atti-
tudes towards medical care in hypothetical states.1 Using this idea, this paper analyzes
health insurance demand and demand for medical care. When people make an insurance
contract, they make provisions for hypothetical health states. The main question is that
of whether and how actual health state dependency aﬀects health insurance markets and
the demand for medical care. In order to predict how a valuation shift aﬀects behavior,
a decision-making model is required. This paper employs the approach used in the litera-
ture on hyperbolic discounting, which decomposes each agent into a sequence of multiple
selves. The analysis does not directly apply the value function concept of prospect theory,
but rather rests on expected utility theory. Furthermore, the paper also analyzes diﬀerent
degrees of rationality, namely the rationality of naive agents, who do not recognize the
change in preferences, and of sophisticated agents, who do foresee the valuation shift, but
nevertheless do not like the change in preferences. As moral hazard is a central issue in
health insurance, the paper also analyzes the relationship between inconsistent preferences
and moral hazard.
The main (positive) ﬁndings of the paper are: First, provided that healthier people
underestimate the marginal willingness to pay for medical treatment, preference incon-
sistency reduces health insurance demand. This holds true, whether agents are naive
or sophisticated. Second, sophisticated agents not only buy less insurance but also may
increase savings in order to shift resources to healthier states. Third, when preference in-
1Stratmann-Schoene and Klose (2001) oppose this interpretation of prospect theory. In their view,
prospect theory requires that the hypothetical health state be the point of reference.
3consistency meets ex-post moral hazard, necessary coinsurance may bring total insurance
demand to a standstill.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section develops the basic economic model
and determines the properties of a welfare maximum. In this context, it proposes a par-
ticular form of the welfare function. Section three characterizes the market for health
insurance and deﬁnes the equilibrium concept. As a starting point, section four describes
the equilibrium when medical care is not at the discretion of patients. Then, sections ﬁve
to seven analyze the full model for diﬀerent types of insured agents, namely naive agents,
agents who are able to commit to medical care demand, and sophisticated agents. In order
to get clear-cut results, a slightly simpler version of the model, which neglects the time di-
mension, is used in section eight. Section nine raises the question of whether inconsistency
reinforces or tones down moral hazard problems. Finally, section ten concludes.
2 Health state-dependent utility and medical care
Ex-ante identical individuals are considered who lives for two periods. While an agent
enjoys good health in the ﬁrst period, he or she might fall ill in the second period. There
are n potential health states Hi, i = 1,...,n, in the second period, where H1 indicates
healthiness. Since the agent is well in the ﬁrst period, the ﬁrst period health state H0 is
equal to H1. Probabilities of health states in the second period pi are exogenous, with
Pn
i=1 pi = 1. Thus, it is assumed that healthy living in the ﬁrst period has no impact
on the transition to second period states. The individual is endowed with Y units of a
composite good. Resources are used for consumption (C) or for medical care (M). The
subscript 0 indicates the ﬁrst period, second-period consumption is identiﬁed by the indi-
cator of the health state. When the agent is in good health, medical care is superﬂuous.
Thus, M0 = M1 = 0, since waste of resources is never optimal. The marginal rate of
transformation between consumption and medical care is state-dependent, but otherwise
constant (constant returns to scale in production). It is denoted by qi which is also con-
sidered to be the price of medical care. The basic arguments of the instantaneous utility
function are consumption and medical care. But preferences also depend on the health
state while demanding medical care Hi and possibly on the health state at the time of con-
4sideration Hj: u(Ci,Mi,Hi,Hj). After the agent becomes ill, it is only the actual health
state which aﬀects preferences: j = i. Utility of the agent in the second period is therefore
ui = u(Ci,Mi,Hi,Hi). However, in the ﬁrst period, it might also be the current health
state which determines preferences on consumption and medical care in some or all states
in the second period: j = 0. Then, utility is ˜ ui = u(Ci,Mi,Hi,H0). In general, the impact
of the health state in the ﬁrst period on the evaluation of health in the second period is
state-dependent. A pure discounting eﬀect, namely ˜ ui = ψ(H0)u(Ci,Mi,Hi,Hi), where ψ
denotes some arbitrary function, is only a very special case which is not the focus of this
analysis. Both, consumption and medical care are assumed to be normal goods. Without
loss of generality, health states are ordered such that m divides the set of states into two
subsets. For all states with i ≤ m, the ﬁrst-period self evaluates medical care on the basis
of the future health state; for all other states, the judgment depends on the health state
at the date of consideration. Preferences are consistent if m is equal to n, whereas they
are otherwise inconsistent. The utility function is strictly concave and increases in C and
M for each health state. Finally, a small open economy is considered. Hence, saving does
not change the rate of interest r. Furthermore, the discount factor δ is equal to 1/(1 + r).
Expected lifetime utility is
















With consistent preferences, the optimum could easily be calculated by maximizing (1)
subject to (2). As pointed out in the introduction, what the optimum actually is, is less
clear with inconsistent preferences. In the case of unstable preferences, the agent can be
considered as being composed of multiple agents (selves). A Pareto optimum is, then,
a sequence of consumption and medical care such that it is impossible to make one self
better oﬀ without harming at least one other self. One way of deﬁning selves is to separate
the individual into the ﬁrst-period self with utility U0 and the second-period selves with
utilities ui. Thus, a sequence of diﬀerent selves can be considered. Then, a Pareto optimum
5maximizes α0U0 +
Pn
i=1 αiui subject to the resource constraint for all feasible α. But this
program has the undesirable feature of the consumption of later selves counting twice.
Furthermore, with consistent preferences, this program would not lead to the individual
optimum (if αi 6= 0). An alternative would be to consider a simultaneous coexistence of
diﬀerent selves. While some selves evaluate health (at least in some states) on the basis of
the ﬁrst-period health state, the evaluation of other selves always depends on the actual
health state. The former might be called the ”inconsistent” type, since preferences depend
















α is the weight of the inconsistent type, and 1−α that of the consistent type. Rearranging
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, i = m + 1,...,n.
As far as preferences are consistent, the marginal utility of income should be equalized
across states [see Breyer and Zweifel (1997)] and over time. Moreover, the marginal rate of
substitution between medical care and the composite good should be equal to the marginal
rate of transformation. In the range where preferences are inconsistent, marginal utility of
income in the ﬁrst period should be equal to a weighted average of type-speciﬁc marginal
utilities of income. Similarly, the marginal rate of transformation should be equalized
with a weighted average of marginal rates of substitution. When inconsistent types do
2The superscript indicates the state and the subscript the variable of partial diﬀerentiation.
6not count (i.e., when α = β = 0), a Pareto optimum is the individual optimum of a
consistent decision maker. In the reverse case, where consistent types do not matter (i.e.,
when α = β = 1), a Pareto optimum coincides with the optimum of the inconsistent
type. However, from a constitutional point of view, these extreme weights are hard to
justify. Behind a veil of ignorance, the ﬁrst-period type is as likely as the second-period
type (since the representative agent lives with certainty for two periods). In other words,
a constitutional welfare function should probably weigh both types equally: α = 0.5.
3 Health insurance market and equilibrium
In period one, the agent can divide his endowment Y into consumption C0, savings S and
health insurance, where the insurance premium is denoted by P: Y = C0+S+P. In period
two, the income consists of capital income S(1 + r) and an indemnity payment Ii, which
depends on the current health state. Although the indemnity policy is less prominent than
in former times, it is a good starting point for the analysis. Later on, a coinsurance tariﬀ
will also be considered. With his or her income Yi, the agent ﬁnances consumption Ci and
medical care qiMi:
Ci = Yi − qiMi, where Yi = S(1 + r) + Ii, i = 1,...,n. (5)
The insurance premium depends on the indemnity payment, on the price of health insur-
ance and on a lump-sum element: P =
Pn
i=2 σiIi + F, where σi > 0 and F ≥ 0. It is
assumed that there is perfect price competition at the health insurance market. Further-
more, since the population is assumed to be homogeneous and preventive activities are
assumed away, adverse selection and moral hazard do not occur. The timing of events is
as follows: First, insurers determine health state-dependent prices σi. Second, individu-
als choose the indemnity payment for each state Ii. Finally, non-demanded contracts are
withdrawn. A set of contracts is an equilibrium at the health insurance market (a) if no
insured person would beneﬁt from a withdrawal or a contract change, (b) if no individual
without insurance would proﬁt from insurance protection, (c) if the expected proﬁt of each
insurer is non-negative and (d) if no insurer could increase expected proﬁts by changing a
contract. At the equilibrium, due to perfect price competition, expected proﬁts are zero.
7Then, the price of insurance equals the discounted probability, σi = pi/(1 + r), and the
lump-sum element matches per capita costs. Hence, ﬁrst-period consumption is





Ii − F (6)
provided that insurance demand is not zero. Otherwise C0 = Y − S.
4 Fixed medical expenditure
As a starting point, health state-dependent but ﬁxed medical expenditure is considered.
Medical care is not a matter of choice: Mi = ¯ Mi. This is a standard assumption in simple
insurance market models [see Breyer and Zweifel (1997)]. Hence, in the second period the
agent has nothing to decide. Furthermore, the utility function can be either reduced to
ui = ui(Ci) or to ˜ ui = ˜ ui(Ci), where the latter is the inconsistent type. All functions are









δpi˜ ui(Ci) s.t. (6) and (5). (7)





C, i = 1,...,m, and u
0
C = ˜ u
i
C, i = m + 1,...,n. (8)
Perceived marginal utility of income is equalized across states and over time. Due to the
concavity of the utility functions, agents buy only partial insurance if, for each amount of
income, the (perceived) marginal utility of income is smaller when the agent is sick than
when he or she is well. In contrast, agents demand extra money in the case of illness if the
marginal utility of income is lowest when agents are in good health.3 However, because of
preference instability, the market equilibrium is non-optimal from a welfare point of view,
provided that second-period selves are not completely neglected (i.e., α < 1). Society would
prefer to give diﬀerent amounts of resources to later selves depending on their health states.
If, for all i = m + 1,...,n and for all x > 0 ˜ ui
C(x) < ui
C(x), at the equilibrium u0
C < ui
C
would hold. Society would like to shift resources to the sick selves with preferences that
3See Cook and Graham (1977) and Breyer and Zweifel (1997) for an analysis with consistent preferences.
8diﬀer from those of their ancestor at the expense of the ﬁrst-period self, of the healthy
second-period self and of the sick second-period self with the same preferences as those of
their ancestor. This happens if the agent does not foresee that he or she needs speciﬁc
consumption goods for an illness which are not included in the actual medical care (special
diet, assistance for the disabled, etc.). If, on the contrary, for all i = m + 1,...,n and for
all x > 0 ˜ ui
C(x) > ui
C(x), healthy persons do not get enough of these. This would be the
case if people could not imagine that sick persons had less opportunity to spend money on
consumption goods.
5 Naive agents
While in the previous section the second-period self was completely passive, the focus now
shifts to active selves. Medical care demand is no longer exogenous. At least three diﬀer-
ent cases with inconsistency can be distinguished between: First, the agent decides at the
start on savings, insurance and state-dependent medical care (commitment). Second, the
second-period self decides on medical care and the ﬁrst-period self assumes that preferences
do not change (naive agent). Third, the ﬁrst-period agent foresees that the second-period
agent not only has diﬀerent preferences on medical care, but will also enforce them (so-
phisticated agent). This section considers the naive agent. He or she predicts that the
later self will choose medical care Mi so as to maximize either u = u(Ci,Mi,Hi,Hi) or
˜ u = u(Ci,Mi,Hi,H0), depending on whether i is smaller than m + 1 or not. Perceived
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i=m+1
δpiu(Ci, ˜ Mi,Hi,H0) (10)
s.t. (6),(5) and ˜ Mi = ˜ Mi(S,Ii),
where perceived medical care ˜ Mi = ˜ Mi(S,Ii) is for i = 2,...,n determined by (9). First-
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C i = m + 1,...,n. (11)
9The solutions S and Ii are the basis for the true decisions of later selves, who maximize






, i = 2,...,n. (12)
Perceived and true medical care demand coincide in states 1 to m, but diﬀer otherwise.
In general, ex-post marginal utility of income is not equalized across states where ﬁrst-
period agents are wrong about their second period preferences (since u0
C = ˜ ui
C holds only
for perceived not for true medical care demand). The result is not a welfare maximum
(according to the deﬁnition given by (3)). qi = ui
M/ui
C would require α = 0, but for α = 0
u0
C = ui
C has to hold. The outcome is suboptimal and typically deviates from the optimum
in the direction described in the previous section:
Proposition 1 With inconsistent preferences and naive agents, the market equilibrium is
not a Pareto optimum.
6 Commitment
When commitment technology exists, the ﬁrst-period agent also determine medical care
demand in all states of the second period. Commitment is possible if medical care is only
provided for insured people and that insurance contracts specify the level of medical care
for every possible disease. Because of the high demands on insurance contracts, on real
insurance markets, commitment is, at most, imperfect. However, it is nevertheless worth











s.t. (6) and (5).
First-order conditions are given by (11) and (9). The ﬁrst-period self behaves as if he or
she were naive. With commitment technology, the indemnity payment in all states and






Figure 1: Naive behavior vs. commitment: HWTP
care, the budget constraint in each state in period two is, with commitment, the same as it
is with naiveness. Whether or not medical care demand is higher with commitment than
it is with naiveness depends on the direction of the valuation shift. It is assumed that
indiﬀerence curves are either ﬂatter or steeper everywhere after the shift:
Assumption 1 (HWTP) In health state i, with i ≥ m + 1, the real marginal willing-
ness to pay for medical care is, for all consumption-medical care bundles, higher than the
hypothetical marginal willingness to pay, i.e., ui
M/ui
C > ˜ ui
M/˜ ui
C.
Assumption 2 (LWTP) In health state i, with i ≥ m + 1, the real marginal willing-
ness to pay for medical care is, for all consumption-medical care bundles, lower than the
hypothetical marginal willingness to pay, i.e., ui
M/ui
C < ˜ ui
M/˜ ui
C.
The former assumption is justiﬁed, e.g., by the ﬁndings of Winter et al. (2003). In each
state where assumption 1 holds, medical care demand with commitment technology is lower
than with naiveness [see ﬁgure 1]. The opposite holds true under assumption 2.
To summarize:
Proposition 2 Naive agents save and buy insurance to the same degree as agents with
commitment technology do. Medical care demand is higher (lower) with naiveness than
with commitment, provided that assumption 1 (2) holds.
117 Sophisticated agents
A sophisticated agent takes the real behavior of later selves into account. Even a sophisti-
cated agent has inconsistent preferences, but he or she is aware of the inconsistency. Under
assumption 1, the ﬁrst period self possibly wants to value bad health states lower than good










s.t. (6),(5) and Mi = Mi(S,Ii),
where each ﬁrst-order condition in the second period qi = ui
M/ui
C, for i = 2,...,n deﬁnes
a function Mi(S,Ii). Since Ci = S(1 + r) + Ii − qiMi,
∂Mi
∂S




where the inequality follows from the normal-good assumption. Using these properties,
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i = m + 1,...,n. (16)
If assumption 1 holds, marginal utility of income is higher in the second period than in the
ﬁrst period: u0
C < ˜ ui
C. It is also higher than in those states where there is no diﬀerence
between the preferences of the succeeding selves. If, from the point of view of the ﬁrst-
period self, the decision on medical care in the second period is suboptimal, he or she
devotes less resources to this particular state.
In order to form a precise idea of how the agents react to preference diﬀerences, it is
useful to consider the two-state case, where the agent is either healthy or sick in the second
period. Furthermore, the range of utility functions will be restricted to ui = vi(Ci,βMi)
and ˜ ui = vi(Ci,Mi). The actual health state aﬀects utility only via the β. If β were equal
to one, the ﬁrst-period self agrees with the second-period self on medical care. Otherwise,


















































































= −(1 + r)

(1 − p2)u0











   
u0







   
.
b1 and b2 are the partial derivatives of the second ﬁrst-order condition with reference to S
and I2, respectively. Due to second-order conditions, ∆ is positive. Since sign(dS/dβ) =
−sign(dI2/dβ), the agent adapts savings and insurance to changes in the preference pa-
rameter β in opposite directions. Moreover, C0 follows S, whereas second-period income
Y2 follows I2. However, the sign of dS/dβ is ambiguous. An increase in β tends to push
savings and to depress insurance demand, particularly if it strengthens the income eﬀect
and if assumption 1 holds. In such a case, the ﬁrst-period self is willing to use a decrease
in the indemnity payment to push the behavior of the second-period self in the right direc-
tion. Moreover, the agent shifts income to the healthy state, where there is no diﬀerence
in preferences. Since β = 1 also characterizes the behavior of the naive agent, under these
circumstances a sophisticated agent saves more and insures less than a naive agent does
and, according to the results of the last section, also than an agent with commitment
technology does.
The well-being of the second-period self depends on his or her income Yi. Thus, the later
self prefers a sophisticated ancestor to other types of agent if Yi is higher than otherwise.
But even if income is lower, the later self may prefer a sophisticated ancestor to one with
access to commitment technology because medical care is at his or her discretion.
13An example: The results can be demonstrated by a simple additive-separable square








aMi − Hi. The marginal
willingness to pay for medical care of the second-period self exceeds that of the ﬁrst-
period self. Per capita costs of insurance F are assumed away. Using the superscripts s
(sophisticated behavior), c (commitment) and n (naive behavior), in the two-state case the





ap2 + q2(2 + r)
<
q2Y (aβ2 + q2)
a2β2p2 + q2







0 = (1 + r)S






































The sophisticated agent saves and consumes more in the ﬁrst period than other types of
agents do. Hence, consumption in the good state is also higher. The indemnity payment
is smaller and, therefore, income is lower in the bad state. Finally, the successor of the
sophisticated self consumes less in the bad state than in the good state.
Supposing there are two diﬀerent types of insurance contracts on the market: basic
insurance and supplementary insurance. If there are per capita costs for supplementary
insurance and if it is only possible to take out a supplementary policy on top of a basic
insurance contract, sophisticated agents can simply reduce the insurance coverage. They
will probably not enter into a supplementary contract if the basic insurance policy is rather
generous.
To sum up, the results are ambiguous:
Proposition 3 Sophisticated agents without commitment will only typically save more and
buy less insurance than agents with commitment technology and than naive agents will
(given assumption 1).
148 Partial insurance
The basic result of the previous sections could be elaborated somewhat more clearly in
a slightly simpler framework. First, the number of health states is reduced to two: m =
1,n = 2. Second, savings are omitted: a one-period version of the model is used. Third,
the instantaneous utility function is additive separable in C and M. The valuation shift
aﬀects only the direct beneﬁts of medical care. Fourth, per capita insurance costs are zero.
The agent pays a premium P = pI in both states, where I is the indemnity payment.4
Thus, consumption is
C1 = Y − pI and C2 = Y + (1 − p)I − qM. (20)
There are still two selves: one before uncertainty is resolved, and one afterwards. The sick
later self chooses M, so as to maximize instantaneous utility u = u(C2,M,H2,H2). The
ﬁrst-order condition u2
M − qu2




(1 − p)u(C1,0,H1,H1) + pu(C2,M,H2,H0) s.t. (20) and M = M(I). (21)
M = M(I) stems from the perceived behavior of the sick later self. Due to the normal good
assumption, dM/dI > 0 holds, irrespective of the self’s type. The ﬁrst-order condition is














where ˜ u = u(C2,M,H2,H0). Were preferences consistent, the term in square brackets
would be zero and the agent would equalize marginal utilities of income and (because of
the additive-separable utility function) would choose C1 = C2 and thus I = qM. The same
holds true for inconsistent preferences if the agent is naive or has commitment technology
at his or her disposal. However, a naive agent purchases full coverage for expected medical
care demand, but not for real demand. Under assumption 1, insurance is only partial,
whereas under assumption 2, overinsurance takes place. Furthermore, under assumption
1, a sophisticated agent chooses C1 > C2 and thus I < qM since the term in square
brackets is negative. Under assumption 2 the inequality directions are reversed.
4In order to simplify notation, subscripts are omitted where possible.
15Proposition 4 Insurance is only partial, irrespective of whether the ﬁrst-period agent is
naive or sophisticated, provided that assumption 1 holds. Under assumption 2, the indem-
nity payment exceeds realized expenditure for medical care.
9 Inconsistency meets moral hazard
In order to discuss the interdependency of inconsistency and ex-post moral hazard, it is
again useful to use the simple model of the previous section. An ex-post moral hazard
problem arises when insurers subsidize medical expenditure instead of making lump sum
payments, provided that the ”necessity” of the agent’s medical care demand is not veriﬁable
(hidden information) and that the insurer cannot directly restrict medical care demand.5
The insured party pays in both states the premium P = spq ¯ M, where s is the matching
rate, with 0 ≤ s ≤ 1,6 and ¯ M is the average medical care demand in the bad health
state. 1−s is the coinsurance rate and there is neither a stop loss nor a maximum beneﬁt.
Consumption is then
C1 = Y − spq ¯ M and C2 = Y − spq ¯ M − (1 − s)qM. (23)
The sick later self chooses M so as to maximize instantaneous utility u = u(C2,M,H2,H2)
taking average medical care demand as given. The ﬁrst-order condition reads
u
2
M − (1 − s)qu
2
C = 0, (24)
which deﬁnes M(s), with dM/ds > 0. Insurance distorts the demand for medical care.
Ceteris paribus the agent demands too much medical care. The earlier self maximizes
expected utility EU = (1−p)u(C1,0,H1,H1)+pu(C2,M,H2,H0), where u(C2,M,H2,H0)
is again denoted by ˜ u. If, on the one hand, the agent were able to choose the subsidy rate,
and, on the other hand, neglected the impact of medical care demand on the premium (i.e.,
took the average as given), he or she would choose the subsidy rate equal to one, whatever
the degree of consistency might be. Given a zero price of medical care, each later self
5Ex-post-moral hazard was ﬁrst analyzed by Zeckhauser (1970).
6The analysis is restricted to linear health insurance although a non-linear scheme is in general optimal
[see Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) and Blomquist (1997)].
16increases M inﬁnitely, since that is the cheapest way to raise the utility level. However,
since the insurer would go bankrupt, no market equilibrium with health insurance and
behavior of this kind exists. A market equilibrium exists if insurers choose the subsidy
rate and the premium themselves. In order to get their share of the market, they choose
the matching rate and the premium as to maximize the insured person’s expected utility
taking the perceived and the real impact of subsidies on medical care demand into account.
It is assumed that the insurer is able to estimate correctly the real medical care demand on
which the calculation of the premium has to be based. Since competition forces insurers
to set the premium as low as possible, i.e., P = spq ¯ M, the subsidy rate can be considered
as a single control variable. The optimization problem is therefore
max
s (1−p)u(C1,0,H1,H1)+pu(C2, ˆ M,H2,H0) s.t. (23), ¯ M = M(s) and ˆ M = ˆ M(s). (25)
ˆ M = ˆ M(s) is deﬁned by (24) if the agent is sophisticated and by a corresponding ﬁrst-
order condition if the agent is naive. First, s has to be smaller than one, since agents
would increase demand for medical care ad inﬁnitum and the insurance company would go
bankrupt if s were equal to or greater than one. Second, the marginal impact on expected
utility of a change in the subsidy rate is
−pq ¯ M([(1 − p)u
1
C + p˜ u
2
















M − (1 − s)q˜ u
2
C
 d ˆ M
ds
.
If preferences were consistent, the second term in square brackets in the second row would
be zero, ¯ M = ˆ M and u = ˜ u would hold, and the optimum matching rate would be strictly
positive [see Breyer and Zweifel (1997)]. If s were zero, the second row would be zero,
and the ﬁrst row would be positive because of C1 > C2. With inconsistent preferences,
behavior changes, depending on the direction of the valuation shift. Under assumption 1,
the insurance market may break down, i.e., a zero subsidy rate may be optimal. For a
naive agent and s = 0, the second row is zero, but the ﬁrst row may be zero or negative
if ¯ M > ˆ M. For a sophisticated agent and s = 0, the ﬁrst row is clearly positive, but
the second row is negative since the second term in square brackets is negative. For a
naive agent, the direct marginal costs of a subsidy may be higher than the direct perceived
17marginal beneﬁts, whereas a sophisticated agent takes into account that the demand for
medical care is already without a subsidy beyond the preferred level.
Under assumption 2, the market works (although imperfectly). A zero-matching rate
is certainly non-optimal, since the ﬁrst row is positive and the second row is either zero or
positive.
To sum up:
Proposition 5 With hidden information, inconsistency of preferences may lead to a col-
lapse of the health insurance market if assumption 1 holds.
10 Concluding remarks
According to empirical studies, their actual health state aﬀects people’s attitudes of to-
wards health and medical care in hypothetical health states. This paper has analyzed the
implications of this phenomenon on health insurance and demand for medical care. It has
built a two-period model of insurance demand where the actual health state in the ﬁrst
period is a point of reference for valuation of second-period needs. It has decomposed
agents into two selves: The ﬁrst-period self makes insurance contracts, the second-period
self buys medical care. The analysis has come up with the following results: First, from
a welfare point of view marginal utilities of income should not be equalized across health
states and the marginal rate of transformation should diﬀer from an individual marginal
rate of substitution if preferences of both types of selves count. The paper argues that this
should be the case. Second, if medical care demand is exogenous (but state-dependent)
the interests of later selves are neglected. The market equilibrium is not a welfare maxi-
mum (if preferences of ﬁrst-period and second-period selves count). This also holds true
if medical care is endogenous. Third, naive agents save and buy insurance as much as
agents with commitment technology do, but medical care demand is higher with naiveness
if healthy people underestimate the marginal willingness to pay for medical care. Fourth,
sophisticated agents without commitment technology will typically save more and buy less
insurance than naive agents and agents with commitment technology will. Fifth, excluding
the opportunity to adapt savings, a sophisticated agent with inconsistent preferences, as
18well as a naive agent, chooses only partial insurance if healthy people underestimate the
marginal willingness to pay for medical care. Sixth, with hidden information inconsistency
of preferences may lead to a collapse of the health insurance market.
To put it in a nutshell, provided that healthy people underestimate the marginal will-
ingness to pay for medical care, preference inconsistency leads to a reduction of health
insurance demand. Under these circumstances, the paper makes some clear predictions
which are open to empirical testing. First, one prediction is that health insurance coverage
is smaller than expected from an ex-post point of view. In particular, the market for sup-
plementary insurance would be too small. Second, the paper predicts that underinsurance
is severest where the discrepancy between the people who decide on insurance demand
and the actual patients is very large. Long-term care seems to be a good example of a
large discrepancy. Inconsistency of preferences might be part of the explanation for the
extremely small market size of long-term care insurance [see Congressional Budget Oﬃce
(2004)] beside adverse selection, moral hazard, administrative costs and nondiversiﬁable
intertemporal risk [see Norton (2000)].
Provided that healthy people underestimate the marginal willingness to pay for med-
ical care and long-term care, the paper has also simple policy implications. On the one
hand, preference inconsistency justiﬁes obligatory basic health insurance and long-term
care insurance. On the other hand, obligatory insurance should not cover all expenditure
for medical care and long-term care that sick and old persons may ask for.
Finally, this paper’s approach has, in particular, one shortcoming which restricts its
domain. At least the welfare analysis requires that health states and probabilities be ex-
ogenous. Otherwise, the nature and ”number” of selves would be endogenous which forbids
conventional welfare analysis. However, for a positive analysis this approach could be ap-
plied to many other areas where valuations and behavior may depend in an inconsistent
manner on state variables like age, cognitive ability, human capital stock, etc.
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